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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.
Professor of Law, College of Law, Denver University.
This review covers the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado from October 1, 1955 to January 1, 1957. It may, to some
extent, overlap the latest review in this field, but it was deemed
desirable to base the review upon the calendar year, rather than
upon a year commencing with the annual convention of the Colo-
rado Bar Association.
The cases will be analyzed as they interpret the Rules of Civil
Procedure, in numerical order. They are not arranged chronologi-
cally. All references to the Rules are based on the Rules of Civil
Procedure as they appear in volume one of Colorado Revised Stat-
utes 1953. Where there is no citation of the official Colorado reports
it is because of the fact that the case has not yet been reported
officially in the reports.
RULE 7 (d)
In Mesch v. Board of County Commissioners1 the Supreme
Court found a failure to comply strictly with the requirements of
Rule 7 (d), because of which there resulted a lack of jurisdiction
in the trial court. The court, pursuant to Rule 106 (a) (4) and (b)
dismissed the writ of error. It also remanded the case, with in-
structions to the trial court to set aside its decision and to dismiss
the proceeding.
RULE 8
Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Company2 is of interest to the
profession for its discussion of the difference between a claim for
relief under the Rules and the old cause of action. The court point-
ed out that in order to state a claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief it is no longer necessary to elect a particular theory
or "cause of action," but that it is sufficient to clearly identify
the transactions which form the basis of the claim for relief and
that if relief is warranted under any theory of law by the evidence
offered, it should not be denied because of the selection of a wrong
"cause of action." The court then reaffirmed the views it had ex-
pressed earlier in the case of Bridges v. Ingram3 . The objection was
also made that the complaint failed to allege ultimate facts, but
the court held that under Rule 8 (e) (1) this objection was not
well taken.
Since Rule 8 (c) specifically requires that in pleading to a pre-
ceding pleading a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, the question may well arise whether a deficiency in
the pleading in this respect may be cured by the introduction of
evidence to show an accord and satisfaction, where no objection is
made to such evidence. In Metropolitan State Bank v. Cox 4 the
court held that under these circumstances the issue is properly
1 133 Colo. 223, 293 P.2d 300 (1956,.
2 303 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1956).
1122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 (195C;).
'302 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1956).
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before the court, just as though it had been raised in the pleadings.
RULE 12.
The problem of general and special appearances seems to recur
in various garbs. It had to be dealt with in the case of Treadwell v.
District Court,5 a proceeding in the nature of prohibition under
Rule 106 (4). The court pointed out that a so-called general appear-
ance filed after a motion to quash service of process for lack of
jurisdiction over the person had no effect, because the Rules make
no provision for general and special appearances. It was held that
such motion having been made before answer, it properly raised the
question of jurisdiction and preserved it until the motion had been
disposed of. The case is also interesting because the court issued
its writ against the action of the district court which required the
defendant to answer, after holding that the general appearance
waived the motion to quash. The court found it to be a matter of
sufficient public interest to have the question of jurisdiction de-
termined before a trial on the merits, to justify the issuance of
the writ under Rule 106 (4).
RULE 18
In the case of Gerbaz v. Hulsey,6 the plaintiffs joined two
claims arising out of the same alleged breach of contract and the
defendant moved that the plaintiffs be required to make an election
of their remedies. The court determined that the claims were not
inconsistent but that they were simply claims for damages arising
out of one breach and were properly joined under Rule 18.
However, the requirements of Rule 10 (b) that the claims or
defenses be set forth in separate paragraphs and counts are in no
way abrogated by the liberal joinder provisions of Rule 18 and
such claims must be separately stated and relief be expressly re-




In Centennial Casualty Co. v. Lacey,8 an action by a car owner
against an insurance carrier under the theft clause of an auto-
mobile policy, the court determined that the holder of a chattel
mortgage on the car was not an indispensable party under Rule
19 (a).
RULE 20
Where a large number of parties join or are joined in an action
it may be a difficult problem to determine whether the require-
ments of this rule regarding transactions or occurrences or
series thereof and common questions of law or fact can be satis-
fied. In Western Homes v. District Court9 some 232 plaintiffs joined
in one action to recover damages for alleged fraudulent misrepre-
sentations. The court ably discussed, at too great length to be set
out here, the meaning of a series of transactions and what con-
5133 Co!o. 520, 297 P.2d 891 (1956).
0 132 Colo. 359, 288 P.2d 357 (1955).
r300 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1956).
s 133 Colo. 357, 295 P.2d 690 (1956).
133 Colo. 304, 296 P.2d 460 (1956).
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stitute common questions of law or fact. The court also discussed
the requirements of Rule 9 (b) as to the sufficiency of allegations
of fraud.
RULE 46
Rule 46 provides that there shall be no prejudice to a party
who fails to object to a ruling of the court when he has no oppor-
tunity to object to the ruling at the time it is made. In Brakhahn
v. Hildebrand0 the plaintiff made no objection to an instruction
on contributory negligence. There was no evidence of contributory
negligence which could have been imputed to plaintiff and it was
undisputed that the plaintiff was afforded no opportunity to reg-
ister an objection. The court held that under Rule 46 it was at lib-
erty to disregard the failure to make an objection under these cir-
cumstances.
RULE 50
Under the provisions of Rule 50 (b) a party who has moved
for a directed verdict may, within ten days after the reception of
the verdict, move to have the verdict and any judgment entered
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with
his motion for a directed verdict. The Rule also provides that a mo-
tion for a new trial may be joined with this motion or a new trial
may be prayed for in the alternative." It seems to be established
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by numerous cases in the federal courts that the filing of a motion
for a directed verdict is a condition precedent to the right to file
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the case of
Ross v. Arrow Manufacturing Co.," the defendant had failed to
move for a directed verdict at any time during the trial but never-
theless filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court did not rule on
the alternative motion and after the case had reached the Supreme
Court the defendant in the trial court filed a petition to remand
to the trial court for a ruling on the alternative motion. This pe-
tition was denied and leave was granted to file briefs on the ques-
tion of the propriety of the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and the case is still pending on that question. The high
court, however, said that under the Rule the defendant was not
entitled to file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
unless he had filed a motion for a directed verdict. If this turns out
to be the holding of the court on this point it will be in accord with
the view expressed many times by the federal courts.'3
In the case of Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Golden Gas Co."
the Supreme Court once more passed upon a question which would
seem to be well settled both in Colorado and in the federal courts. 5
The defendant made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, joining with it the alternative motion for a new trial. The
motion for judgment was granted but no ruling was made on the
alternative motion. The court held, in line with its previous ruling,
that the granting of the motion for judgment does not effect an
automatic denial of the alternative motion for a new trial and that
the trial court should have ruled on the defendant's motion for a
new trial at the same time.
RULE 51
In Stephens v. Lung, 6 the record showed objections to the giv-
ing of certain instructions but showed no objection to an instruction
on contributory negligence, which was claimed to be erroneous.
Counsel insisted that the reference in the record to other instruc-
tions was inadvertent and that all arguments had been directed to
the one on contributory negligence. The court held that it was error
to give the instruction and that substantial justice required that
the error be noticed in spite of the absence of a formal objection of
record.
Again, in the case of Warner v. Barnard7 the court noticed an
error in the giving of an instruction where no objection was made
to it at the trial, pointing out that Rule 51 is subject to the qualifi-
cation that the court, on its own motion, may notice manifest error
whether raised by counsel or not, if the same appears of record and
133 Colo. 531, 299 P.2d 502 (1956).
Barron v. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1079. See, e.g., Guerrero v. American.
Hawaiian S. S. Co., 222 .F2d 238 (9th Cir. 19).
14 133 Colo. 537, 298 P.2d 950 (1956).
. See Montgomery Ward v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940); Singer v. Chitwood, 126 Colo. 173,
247 P.2d 905 (1952).
16 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956).
17 304 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1956).
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if justice will be served thereby, especially in view of the provisions
of Rule 111 (f) which permit the court, in its discretion, to notice
any error appearing of record.
RULE 54
Since Rule 54 (c) provides that every final judgment (except
by default) shall grant the relief to which the party is entitled,
even if such relief has not been demanded, the decision in Regin-
nitter v. Fowler' seems to be based upon sound principles. The
court held that to determine whether the action of the trial court
in sustaining a motion to dismiss is correct, the question is whether,
in the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to any
relief, and if, upon any theory of law relief should be granted, then
the motion to dismiss cannot be sustained and appropriate relief
should be granted.
RULE 57
In People v. Baker19 the court was called upon to interpret Rule
57 (f) and held that the absence of persons whose presence was re-
quired because they had or claimed to have interests which might
be affected prevented their being bound by the action of the court
and that therefore the action should not be maintained because the
judgment would not terminate the uncertainty nor determine the
controversy, nor would it serve any useful purpose in clarifying
and settling the legal relations in issue.
132 Colo. 489, 290 P.2d 223 (1955).
1' 297 P.2d 273 (Colo. 1956).
CLASSIFIED ADVERTISING
Classified Advertising 50c per
line. Minimum $2.00 per ad.
FOR SALE: All complete current sets
-Colorado Reports and Colorado
Appeals; Pacific 2d; C. J.; U. S.
(Law Ed.) and Digest. Write Neil
S. Mincer, 315 Eighth Street, Glen-
wood Springs, Colo.
WILL TRADE right arm or coin of
the realm for complete set of Colo-
rado Reports and Colorado Ap-
peals. Paul Snyder, 317 Third St.,
Castle Rock, Colo.
TWO LARGE OFFICES AVAILABLE
IN WELL APPOINTED LAW SUITE IN
DESIRABLE DOWNTOWN DENVER
OFFICE BUILDING. ASSOCIATION
WITH LAW FIRM POSSIBLE. ALL
INQUIRIES STRICTLY CONFIDEN-
TIAL. INQUIRE DICTA, BOX 204.
YOUR Share of
American Industry
You can share in ownership
of American industry through









Since Rule 111 permits a writ of error from the Supreme Court
to a final judgment, the question has arisen with some frequency
whether or not an order granting a new trial is a final judgment
to which a writ of error will lie. In Gonzales v. Trujillo," the most
recent case to raise the point, the Supreme Court once again held
that the granting of a motion for a new trial is not a final judgment
and is therefore not reviewable on writ of error. The court dis-
missed the writ of error.
In Deeds v. Proudfit2l the court re-affirmed what it called a
long established rule that when the district court has had no oppor-
tunity to pass upon a question, it may not be urged in the Supreme
Court.
In Kopff v. Judd 2 the court again determined that no writ of
error lies to a final judgment (here, an order dissolving a writ of
attachment, which is a final judgment under Rule 102 (aa) where
no motion for a new trial was filed and the trial court made no
order dispensing with such motion. The court held, also, that under
Rule 102 (aa) compliance with Rule 59 (f) is essential to a right of
review by writ of error.
RULE 60
In Salter v. Board of County Commissioners" an action was
brought to vacate a judgment which had been entered nineteen
months before the suit was brought and satisfied five months be-
fore the suit, the judgment debtor having voluntarily paid the
judgment. The court dismissed the writ of error on the ground that
the order of the trial court denying the vacation of the judgment
was not a final judgment from (sic) 24 which a writ of error will
lie. The court also stated that under Rule 60 (b) a motion to vacate
a judgment must be filed within a reasonable time and further,
that when the judgment debtor voluntarily has paid the judgment
he is thereafter barred from questioning technicalities, either of
pleading or form, incident to its entry.
e' 133 Colo. 64, 291 P.2d 1063 (1956).
s' 133 Colo. 85, 293 P.2d 643 (1956).
133 Colo. 138, 292 P.2d 345 (1956).
Obviously the word "from" should be "to."
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In Burr v. Allard25 there was filed what was apparently a time-
ly motion to set aside a judgment, the defendant stating that he had
a good and valid defense to the action. The motion was -denied,
since the grounds upon which it was based consisted of only legal
conclusions, with no supporting facts to show a defense. The court
held that, under these circumstances, there was no abuse of dis-
cretion in denying the motion, since, under earlier Colorado de-
cisions the defendant had the burden to establish grounds for relief
under Rule 60 and had failed to sustain that burden.
RULE i05
In Meaker v. District Court" the plaintiff had filed a lis pen-
dens under Rule 105 (f). The district court ordered the plaintiff to
release the interest claimed by him in the property and the plain-
tiff then filed in the Supreme Court a proceeding in the nature of
prohibition to stay the proceedings in the district court in order to
prevent it from enforcing its order by contempt or other means.
The Supreme Court refused to entertain the proceedings on the
ground thata writ of error to any judgment of contempt that might
be entered was a speedy and adequate remedy.
RULE 106
In Womack v. Grandbush2 7 the.judgment creditor, proceeding
under Rule 106 (a) (5), filed his petition to compel the wife of the
judgment debtor to show cause why she should not be bound by
the judgment, basing his petition on allegations that the wife was,
in fact, the partner of the judgment debtor. The trial court dis-
missed the petition. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the rule,
held that the judgment creditor was entitled to have recourse to the
rule, under these circumstances.
RULE 111
There have been eight cases calling for an interpretation of
Rule 111, during the period covered. Two of the cases involve for-
malities connected with the entry of the judgment.
In Jones v. Galbasini28 the record showed the trial court's writ-
ten ruling, the court's minute order to the clerk to enter a judgment
m 133 Colo. 270, 293 P.2d 969 (1956).
w 300 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1956).
' 298 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1956).
2299 P.2d 503 (Colo. 1956).
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of dismissal and the judgment so entered by the clerk. The ques-
tion related to the timeliness of the writ of error and the court held
that this record showed a final judgment to which a writ of error
would lie.
In Green v. Jones29 the court denied a motion to dismiss a writ
of error based on the ground that it had not been sued out within
ninety days of the date on which the motion for a new trial had
been denied. This was true, but the application for the writ of error
and the filing of the record on error had occured within ninety
days of the date of entry of judgment, which included interest on
the verdict. This the record showed. The court pointed out that the
final judgment had actually been entered within ninety days of the
writ of error and that therefore the writ of error was not subject
to the motion to dismiss on the ground presented. This case is of
interest in view of the decisions in this state that where the judg-
ment is entered before the ruling on the motion for a new trial
that until a motion' for a new trial is determined a judgment is not
final.3
0
Four of the cases concerned the problem of what constitutes
a final judgment to which a writ of error properly lies. In the case
of Hizel v. Hizel3' the problem was one of a general nature, resolved
in favor of expediency. In dismissing, as premature, a writ of error
to review the action of the district court in refusing to make certain
interlocutory orders concerning alimony, the court said:
"In a sense, some of the orders involved, concerning alimony,
have such finality that, strictly speaking, they are orders, and
judgments thereon to which a writ of error may lie; however,
it is more desirable that these matters await final disposition of
the case on its merits."2
In McMullin v. Denver33 no review of the final judgment was
sought, but a motion was made to modify such final judgment or
decree. The court said: "a writ of error will not lie from (sic) a
ruling subsequently entered refusing to modify or change the final
decree."3
4
In Rigel v. Kaveny35 the writ of error was issued solely to re-
view the propriety of an order appointing a receiver. There had
been no trial on any issue of the case. The plaintiff in error sought
a review of rulings of the trial court on motion to strike portions
of the answer. The appellate court held that such rulings would
not be considered, since such rulings did not end the action, prior
to the entry of a final judgment in the case.
The latest case on this problem is People v. District Court."c
Here the court said that where the district court had made an un-
authorized order remanding a cause to the Public Utilities Com-
mission with directions to hold a hearing in conjunction with cer-
tain findings, such order or "decision" was not a final judgment
29304 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1956).
2
0See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Hall, 116 Colo. 566, 183 P.2d 986 (1947).
81 132 Colo. 379, 288 P.2d 354 (1955).
8 Id. at 381, 288 P.2d at 355.
133 Colo..297, 294 P.2d 918 (1956).
Id. at 300, 294 P.2d at 918.
• 133 Colo. 556, 298 P.2d 396 (1956)
303 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1956).
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to which a writ of error could be directed, since it did not put an
end to the suit. In all of the above cases, the essential element of
finality was lacking.
Two of the cases involving Rule 111 related to the actual form
of the record in the Supreme Court and illustrate again the im-
portance of a compliance with the requirements of the rule.
In the record in Allison v. Heller17 the Summary of Argument
which, under Rule 111 (f) is required to state "clearly and briefly
the grounds upon which he relies," comprised three full typewritten
pages and were, in essence, arguments. The court pointed out that
the Summary of Argument supplants what were formerly desig-
nated Assignments of Error and, later, Specification of Points and
that the Summary of Argument here did not comply with the
rules. The court further held that to state that the verdict (in this
case there was no verdict but findings by the court) was contrary
to the law, to the evidence and to the law and the evidence was
meaningless, and so general as to cover any possible question and,
therefore, would not be noticed or considered. The court reached
the same conclusion in the case of Phipps v. Hurd.8
RULE 112
The three cases which deal with this rule all relate to sub-
division (f) of the rule, which concerns the reporter's transcript.
In Bonham v. City of Aurora3 the entry of judgment for the
defendant, based upon findings in its favor, contained no specifica-
tion of time for tendering a reporter's transcript. The court held
that under these circumstances the time fixed by Rule 112 (f) con-
trolled, and since no extension of time for lodging the transcript
had been allowed, a transcript filed after sixty days from the date
of judgment could not be considered.
In Brennan Construction Co. v. Colorado Springs Co.,40 after
the issuance of the writ of error, the reporter's transcript, which
had been lodged by the plaintiff in error, was stricken, on motion.
A motion to dismiss the writ of error was then filed and in grant-
ing it the court held that where the only grounds for reversal would
be found in such reporter's transcript there was nothing for the
court to consider. The record of the clerk of the trial court dis-
closed no basis for a reversal.
In Ratliff v. Davis41 the trial court had allowed sixty days with-
in which to prepare and tender a reporter's transcript. No extension
of time had been granted. The transcript, as filed in the Supreme
Court, failed to show that it had been lodged in the trial court or
that notice of lodging had ever been given to opposing counsel,
although it did bear the signature of the trial judge affixed at a
time which was later than sixty days after the order. Because the
transcript had not been tendered within the time limited by the
order of the trial court it was disregarded by the Supreme Court.
37 132 Colo. 415, 289 P.2d 160 (1955).
'~ 133 Colo. 547, 297 P.2d 1048 (1956).
' 133 Colo. 276, 294 P.2d 267 (1956).
:o 133 Colo. 301, 295 P.2d 686 (1956).
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